Abstract. In 2013, Boneh and Zhandry introduced the notion of indistinguishability (IND) in chosen plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks by a quantum adversary which is given superposition access to an oracle for encryption and decryption queries but is restricted to classical queries in the challenge phase. In this paper we define IND-CPA and IND-CCA notions for symmetric encryption schemes where the adversary has full quantum superposition access to the oracle, and give constructions that achieve these security notions. Our results are formulated in the concrete security framework.
Introduction
Even though scalable quantum computers cannot be built using current technology, the fact that they may become possible in the future has an impact on present-day information security. The relatively recent field of post-quantum cryptography [2] therefore studies classical schemes that remain secure if the adversary possesses a quantum computer. (Here and throughout the paper, "classical" is taken to mean "non-quantum".) Since the subject of post-quantum cryptography is the security of present classical technology against future quantum attacks, the usual assumption is that only the adversary possesses quantum capabilities. This means that all communication between the adversary and the legitimate parties, in particular oracle access, is assumed to be classical.
In 2013, Boneh and Zhandry [5] went beyond this paradigm by introducing a security model in which the adversary is given quantum superposition access to encryption and decryption oracles. Their work is of considerable conceptual interest. In addition, it may become practically relevant in a future technological landscape where some cryptographic protocols are implemented on quantum computers.
Boneh and Zhandry define a notion of indistinguishability (IND) in chosen plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks through a game with two phases. In the first phase (the query phase) the adversary is given unrestricted superposition oracle access. In the second phase (the challenge phase) the adversary is only allowed to make classical queries.
Why is there a restriction in the challenge phase? In their paper, Boneh and Zhandry show that some restriction is necessary. The reason is, effectively, that a quantum computer can easily distinguish between the encryption of a single message and the encryption of an equal superposition of all possible messages, independently of the details of the encryption. The restriction to classical challenge queries prevents the adversary to exploit this fact and allows Boneh and Zhandry to prove that their security notion is achievable. It is worth pointing out that even in standard (classical) indistinguishability notions it is necessary to restrict the class of allowed challenge queries, to prevent the adversary from winning the game trivially by exploiting information about, e.g., message length.
There is a sense, however, in which a restriction to classical challenge queries seems too strong. Considering quantum oracle access makes sense only in view of a future technological environment in which the legitimate parties use quantum computers. In such an environment, it is likely that the encryption schemes considered here will form part of a wider quantum communication infrastructure. Without a precise specification of the nature of this infrastructure, one should not rule out a priori the possibility that an adversary might benefit from the ability to distinguish between superpositions of messages or ciphertexts.
In this paper we introduce an achievable security notion where the adversary has full superposition access to an oracle. We define an indistinguishability (IND) notion in both chosen plaintext (CPA) and chosen ciphertext (CCA) attacks. Our IND notion, which we call "real or permutation" (RoP), is equivalent to standard IND notions in the case of classical oracle queries, but is immune to the attack discovered by Boneh and Zhandry in the case of quantum superposition queries. It also falls outside the classification of security notions recently given by Gagliardoni, Hülsing and Schaffner [6] . It would be worthwhile to study the relationship between our CPA notion and the qIND-qCPA notion defined in [6] . Whereas we consider direct quantum-mechanical interaction between adversary and oracle, qIND-qCPA requires the adversary to submit classical descriptions of its quantum queries.
In a RoP experiment, the adversary is given access to one of two encryption oracles. One oracle simply encrypts challenge messages chosen by the adversary, whereas the other oracle applies a random permutation to the message and then encrypts it. The adversary's goal is to distinguish between the two cases. For classical queries, applying a random permutation to a message is equivalent to replacing the message by a random string. For classical queries, the RoP security notion is therefore equivalent to the "real or random" notion defined in [3] . In the quantum case, the RoP notion allows for arbitrary quantum superposition queries in all phases of the experiment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our security model, for which we adopt the concrete-security paradigm [3] . Section 3 discusses quantum pseudorandom functions (QPRF) and their existence from the concrete-security standpoint. In Section 4 we define our real or permutation IND-CPA notion and show that it is achieved by a slight modification of a standard construction. The CCA case is the topic of Section 5. The proof that the RoP IND-CCA notion is achievable is the main contribution of this paper. The proof contains new ideas and substantial input from quantum information theory.
In this paper we address the security of symmetric encryption schemes against quantum adversaries [8, 11] . We adopt the usual definition of a symmetric encryption scheme as a triple SE = (K, E, D) consisting of a (randomized) key generation algorithm K, a (randomized) encryption algorithm that takes a plaintext M and a key K and returns a ciphertext C = E K (M ), and a decryption algorithm satisfying D K (E K (M )) = M for all messages M . We assume that E is randomized, i.e., its output depends on a string r which is chosen randomly each time E is invoked.
We will consider both chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), where an adversary is given access to an encryption oracle, and chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA), where the adversary in addition has access to a decryption oracle. We will assume that both E and D are implemented on a quantum computer [10] , and that the adversary is given superposition access to the corresponding oracles. By this we mean, roughly, that the adversary can make encryption queries consisting of quantum superpositions of messages, to which the oracle responds with a corresponding superposition of ciphertexts, and similarly for decryption queries in the CCA case.
Formally we define a superposition query as follows. For any function f :
where x is an n-bit string, y is an m-bit string, and |x, y = |x |y = |x ⊗ |y ,
the computational basis states, form an orthonormal basis of 2 n+m -dimensional complex Hilbert space. Equation (1) defines the action of U f for arbitrary quantum states on the quantum register, including superposition states and including the case that the register is entangled with some other quantum register.
In this scenario, an encryption query consists in the application of the unitary U EK to a quantum register under the control of the adversary, and similarly for a decryption query. We place no restrictions on the initial state of the adversary's register. If the initial state is of the superposition form |ψ = M c M |M, 0 with arbitrary complex coefficients c M , the result of the query is
The resources required to apply the unitary U EK to a quantum register are independent of the initial state |ψ of the register. Applying a unitary can be thought of as a single physical operation, for which the number of terms in the superposition state |ψ is irrelevant. Since the encryption oracle does not "know" whether it acts on a superposition or on a single basis state, we will assume that the random string r required for the randomized encryption is chosen exactly once every time U EK is applied. This means that r is the same for all terms in the sum in Eq. (3).
In the most general definition, a quantum adversary A is a quantum algorithm that runs on a quantum computer. In this paper, we will assume that A takes an (optional) bit string i as input, has access to one or more oracles f 1 , f 2 , . . . and eventually halts, outputting a bit string o. We will denote this process by
We will assume that A maintains a quantum register Q A for the purpose of making oracle queries, a quantum register S A for doing quantum computations and for storing its internal state between invocations, and a register R A for classical input and output. Passing an argument i to A is done by placing i into the register R A . One could model R A as a quantum register, but in practice one would expect quantum algorithms to have classical as well as quantum parts. Whenever A makes a query to an oracle f , the unitary operation U f defined in Eq. (1) is applied to the register Q A . Since it is implicit in Eq. (1) that U f is applied to n + m qubits, we will assume that A puts the parameters n and m in the register R A if there is any ambiguity. In this paper we adopt the concrete security framework [3] . Instead of focusing on polynomial algorithms in an asymptotic sense, concrete security concerns bounds on an adversary's success probability as a function of the actual resources available to the adversary.
The most relevant resources for the purposes of this paper are the running time of a quantum adversary A, and the number of oracle queries made by A. We define the running time as the time, in seconds, that elapses until A writes its final output and halts, including any initialization steps. There exist a number of further potentially important resource parameters, such as memory size, or the number of qubits required by A, but since these do not play any explicit role in the reduction arguments given below, we will not discuss them here.
Our reduction arguments can be read in a very "concrete" way, e.g., "if there exists a specific quantum adversary that, in 10 4 seconds and using 10 9 oracle queries achieves an advantage of 2 × 10 −2 in an attack on scheme X, then one can construct another quantum adversary that, also in 10 4 seconds and using 10 9 oracles queries, achieves an advantage of at least 10 −2 in an attack on scheme Y ." Working within the concrete-security paradigm and measuring running time in seconds rather than as the number of, say, gate operations has the clear advantage that it leads to definitions and theorems which are independent of any particular computing or quantum computing model.
Quantum pseudorandom functions
In a concrete security framework, a quantum pseudorandom function, or QPRF, is simply a family of functions. What turns a family of functions into a QPRF is a pair of experiments that defines an adversary's QPRF advantage. So let F : K × X → Y be a function family identified by the set K. Consider two oracles: one formed by an instance F K = F (K, ·) for a random K ∈ K, the other given by a function f chosen randomly from the set Func(X , Y) of functions from X to Y. The QPRF advantage is a measure of the adversary's ability to distinguish an instance drawn from the function family from a function chosen at random from Func(X , Y). In the next two sections, we will analyze the security of encryption schemes which are based on a QPRF. For these schemes to be secure, we need to assume that there exists a function family F such that its QPRF-advantage is extremely small for any quantum adversary using resources that are available now or might become available in the foreseeable future. Such function families are widely believed to exist in the form of standard block ciphers, for instance AES-256. The best currently known quantum attack against AES-256 uses Grover's search algorithm [7, 10] and requires of the order of 2 128 queries to find the encryption key with high probability. The security of the schemes discussed below depends on the heuristic assumption that AES-256 or similar block ciphers cannot be broken by a quantum computer using realistic resources.
Definition 1 (QPRF). Define experiments Exp

Quantum Superposition Chosen Plaintext Attack
To define indistinguishability in a CPA attack for a symmetric encryption scheme SE, we introduce a pair of experiments as in Figure 2 . We call them real or permutation, or RoP, experiments, in analogy to the real or random notion defined in [3] . In each experiment, the quantum adversary is given superposition access to an encryption oracle. The encryption oracle responds to each encryption query by applying a unitary transformation to the adversary's quantum register 
and if
where Π is a permutation chosen uniformly at random. This means that in the case b = 0, before the encryption a random permutation is applied to each term in the superposition of plaintexts. The goal of the quantum adversary is to distinguish between the two experiments. This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as defined in Section 2.
⊓ ⊔
We now show that the above RoP-qsCPA indistinguishability notion can be achieved. To motivate our construction, we first show that the following standard construction (see, e.g., [9] ) is insecure with respect to our notion : Construction 1': Let F be a QPRF. The following construction defines a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E, D):
Suppose the state N m |0, m is submitted to the encryption oracle, where N is a normalization constant. In the "real case" (b = 1), the result is the state N m |m, m ⊕ y , where y = F K (r). In the "permutation" case (b = 0), the result is the state N m |m, Π(m ⊕ y) . A Fourier transform followed by a measurement will distinguish these two states with probability almost 1.
The problem is that the same randomness r is used for all terms in the superposition. The following modified construction overcomes this problem.
Construction 1: Let F be a QPRF. The following construction defines a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (E, D):
To prove that the modified construction achieves our notion of RoP-qsCPA security, we are going to provide a straightforward reduction proof. In the concrete security framework adopted here this means that, if the above construction can be broken by a specific quantum adversary, the reduction establishes the existence of a quantum adversary using similar resources that breaks the underlying QPRF. But as we saw in Section 3, a QPRF based on a suitably chosen block cipher is currently thought to be secure against quantum attacks.
Theorem 1 (RoP-qsCPA security is achievable). Let A be a quantum adversary attacking the encryption scheme SE, based on a QPRF F as in Construction 1, in the RoP-qsCPA sense. Assume A makes at most q queries to the encryption oracle and has advantage
Adv rop−qscpa SE (A) ≥ ǫ .
Then there exists a quantum adversary B attacking F , making at most q queries to the encryption oracle and having advantage
.
Proof. To prove the theorem one (i) establishes the security of the scheme when F is replaced by a truly random function f . Then (ii) one shows that, if the scheme is insecure when the QPRF F is used, then there exists a quantum adversary which can distinguish F from a truly random function and thus breaks F .
For part (i), assume that in Construction 1, the QPRF F K is replaced by a random function g, and in the j-th invocation of the encryption oracle (j = 1, . . . , q), the QPRF F r is replaced by a random function f j . Assume that the length of s is chosen so large that computing f j (m) for all m and j leads to collisions with exponentially small probability. For simplicity we assume that the same QPRF is used throughout, if necessary by padding keys and/or arguments. No collisions means that for all m 1 , m 2 in the message space and for all i, j, f i (m 1 ) = f j (m 2 ) ⇒ i = j and m 1 = m 2 . Then g(f j (m)) for all m and j are independent random strings. Therefore the set {(f j (m), g(f j (m)) ⊕ m)} is information-theoretically indistinguishable from the set {(f j (m), g(f j (m)) ⊕ Π(m))}. It follows that having access to superpositions of states from the one or the other set cannot give rise to a positive advantage.
The above argument relies on the fact that information-theoretic notions carry over to the quantum case. This is the only quantum argument needed in this proof. Part (ii) of the proof proceeds by a standard hybrid argument that assumes only classical queries. It is therefore omitted here.
Quantum Superposition Chosen Ciphertext Attack
In a CCA attack against a symmetric encryption scheme SE the quantum adversary is given, in addition to an encryption oracle as in the CPA case, superposition access to a decryption oracle. To define indistinguishability in this case, we introduce the pair of experiments in Figure 3 . The decryption oracle responds to each decryption query by applying the following unitary transformation to the quantum adversary's register Q A :
To arrive at a meaningful definition, we have to exclude decryption queries consisting in the results of encryption queries. 
This advantage refers to a specific quantum adversary using resources as defined in Section 2. ⊓ ⊔
The restriction on the adversary's decryption queries could be made less restrictive by replacing the condition c|ρ d j |c = 0 by c|ρ d j |c < δ for some δ > 0. The complication entailed by this did not, however, seem justified as, due to the randomization, the ciphertext space is much larger than the message space. It is worth pointing out it cannot be checked even in principle whether the adversary honors the restriction on its decryption queries. This is because, in a superposition query, the oracle (or experiment) can have no information on what messages or ciphertexts are submitted as part of the query.
We now show that the above indistinguishability notion can be achieved by the following standard Encrypt-then-MAC construction [4] : Construction 2: Let SE = (E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme and let F be a QPRF. The following construction defines a symmetric encryption scheme
otherwise, output ⊥
The symbol ⊥ denotes some fixed string that is outside the message space. The decryption returns ⊥ if the tag is invalid. A quantum decryption oracle is described by a unitary operator V acting on a register state |x, c, τ as follows:
The following theorem establishes that, if the above construction can be broken by a specific quantum adversary, then there exist quantum adversaries using similar resources that break the underlying QPRF or the RoP-qsCPA security of the underlying scheme SE. But as we saw in Sections 3 and 4, a QPRF based on a suitably chosen block cipher is currently thought to be secure against quantum attacks, and RoP-qsCPA security is achievable.
Theorem 2 (RoP-qsCCA security is achievable). Consider the scheme SE ′ in Construction 2 based on a QPRF F and an encryption scheme SE. Assume A is a quantum adversary attacking SE ′ in the RoP-qsCCA sense, making at most q e encryption and q d decryption queries to the oracle, and having advantage Adv
Then there exist quantum adversaries B and J attacking SE and F respectively, as follows. B makes at most q e encryption oracle queries. J makes at most q d oracle queries. The advantages satisfy
where n τ is the length of the tag τ as defined in Construction 2.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we first modify Construction 2 by replacing F with a true random function f . We then show, roughly, (i) that a quantum adversary that can distinguish between these two constructions can break the QPRF security of F , and (ii) that a quantum adversary that breaks the modified construction can break the CPA security of the underlying scheme SE. We denote the modified scheme by SE = ( E, D):
Here, f is a function chosen uniformly at random. Now let A be a quantum adversary attacking the CCA security of SE ′ . A standard argument [9] then leads to the construction of a quantum adversary J attacking the QPRF F , making q d oracles queries and having advantage
where the right hand side is one-half the difference between the advantages of A in the experiments Exp (A) respectively. To represent the actions of the oracles on the register Q A of the quantum adversary A, it is convenient to split Q A in three sections, as follows. In the case of SE, the action of the encryption oracle is then given by
where
and τ = f (c), and the action of the decryption oracle is given by
We can use a quantum adversary A attacking the RoP-qsCCA security of SE to construct a quantum adversary B attacking the RoP-qsCPA security of SE using q e encryption oracles queries. The quantum adversary B runs A, and uses its oracles to provide a simulation of A's oracles in the RoP-qsCCA experiment. B simulates A's decryption queries by answering all of them with ⊥. We need to link the advantages of A and B.
The main difficulty here is to derive a bound on the additional advantage of A due to its ability to make decryption queries. In a classical (non-quantum) setting, since f is a true random function, the probability that an adversary forges a valid tag for a ciphertext would be q d /2 nτ . A classical adversary therefore would get ⊥ almost every time in response to its decryption queries, which means that the decryption oracle would be essentially useless to the classical adversary. But because our adversary A is able to make superposition queries, we have to work harder.
As in the classical proof, we will derive the required bound by considering a modified decryption oracle which always returns ⊥ in response to the quantum adversary's decryption queries, irrespective of the values of c and τ . We will refer to the experiment with the modified oracle as scenario Q0, and to the original experiment as scenario Q1.
In scenario Q1, the decryption oracle returns ⊥ only if the tag is invalid. Similary to Eq. (8), the action of the decryption oracle is thus described by the unitary operator V acting on a register state |x, c, τ as follows:
The time evolution of the quantum adversary can then be written as
followed by a binary measurement whose outcome is the guess b ′ . The input state |s is the result of some initialisation. The unitary operators U i describe the evolution of the adversary between decryption queries and include the actions of the encryption oracle. The probability of outcome b ′ depends on the bit b in the experiment. We will denote the probability that the outcome in scenario Q1 is b ′ = 1 for the two cases b = 0 and b = 1 by Pr Q1−0 (b ′ = 1) and Pr Q1−1 (b ′ = 1), respectively. We have then
where we have introduced the notation Adv Q1 for convenience. The only difference in scenario Q0 is that the decryption oracle always returns ⊥. We denote the action of the decryption oracle in this case byṼ, which acts like this:Ṽ |x, c, τ = |x ⊕ ⊥, c, τ .
The time evolution of the quantum adversary in scenario Q0 is then given by
again followed by a binary measurement whose outcome is the guess b ′ . We will denote the probability that the outcome in scenario Q0 is b ′ = 1 for the two cases b = 0 and b = 1 by Pr Q0−0 (b ′ = 1) and Pr Q0−1 (b ′ = 1), respectively. Since in scenario Q0 the decryption oracle always return ⊥, it is not useful for the quantum adversary A. This leads to a bound on the CPA advantage of the adversary B:
where we have introduced the notation Adv Q0 again for convenience. The key relation between the probabilities for scenarios Q0 and Q1 is provided by the following claim:
independently of the value of the bit b. From inequality (19), together with the unproblematic assumption that Pr 
which proves the theorem.
All that remains to be done is therefore to prove the claim (19). We start by examining the expressions (14) and (17). Since, in general, the unitaries U i entangle the adversary's quantum register with its internal registers, one cannot assume that the quantum register is in a pure state during decryption queries. Denote by C the set of all (classical) ciphertexts c. For any ciphertext c ∈ C, define the projector 
Denote by ρ e i the state of the quantum register after the i-th encryption query in scenario Q1. Let C ′ be the set of all ciphertexts that do not result from any encryption query. That is, C ′ is the set of ciphertexts that have zero weight in all encryption queries, i.e., 
where Tr denotes the trace. We can now define the set C valid as the set of pairs (c, f (c)) that do not result from any encryption query,
Since
trying to guess τ = f (c) given a ciphertext c ∈ C ′ leads to a valid pair with very small probability. The results of the q e encryption queries contain no information about the set C valid . Now let ρ d i be the state of the quantum register before the i-th decryption query in scenario Q1, and define
That is, with probability at least 1 − 
irrespectively of the value of the bit b. It follows that
We can now choose ξ so that this has the most convenient form. One possibility is ξ = 2 −nτ /4 , which leads to
which establishes the claim (19). This completes the proof of the theorem. ⊓ ⊔
